ࡱ> Root Entry F؝E 1TablexWordDocument>SummaryInformation(   !"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~Root Entry F'ugI 1TablexWordDocument1BZSummaryInformation(   !"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~DocumentSummaryInformation8CompObjX0Table 0Data   pl,   C&14?VHQ]Shq{pӆ5lf      ph,   C&14?VHQ one, that the Buddha is living in you, are too flat because they are too abstract and conceptual. The stress is on action, not on reason, as we will see. Buddha himself had no use for philosophy. The attack on philosophy involves the following views by the adherents of Zen and by Wittgenstein: a. the claim that they are not themselves doing philosophy; that they are showing rather than telling. b. that therapy replaces philosophy. c. that theory should be replaced by attending to the concrete and particular. d. that ordinary language use and everyday situations should be our guide, rather than philosophy. e. that action should be our guide, rather than reasoning, description rather than explanation. f. that fixed philosophical definitions and categories give a partial picture as compared with actual living practice. Both Zen and Wittgenstein's view will here be referred to as philosophies even though Buddha and Wittgenstein claimed they were not doing philosophy. The above attitudes toward philosophy are part of the overall views of each philosophy. These views may be outlined as follows: I. Negative Side. Opposing Traditional Notions of the Following A. Philosophy B. Mind C. Oppositions 1. subjectobject 2. selfother 3. internalexternal 4. privatepublic D. Identity and contradiction E. Definition and naming (There is no hidden, fixed, or final way.) F. Causation, explanation, reason II. Positive Side A. Stress on nature 1. the concrete and specific 2. doing 3. the everyday and actual 4. the total, concrete situation 5. description, not explanation; showing, not telling 6. ordinary language and the colloquial B. Humor as insight C. Revealing statements (The model, Koan and Haiku.) The above characteristics as applied to Zen may appear to leave out the essential point, namely, that to say anything about Zen is to misinterpret it, or that about the Zen enlightenment or Satori nothing can be said. Satori is supposedly a private experience to which reason, analysis and description have no access. It is a mystical, ineffable experience. We think of knowing as being able to say something about something. The question arises as to whether we can know what we supposedly cannot say anything about, in this case, Satori. Perhaps then virtually all writings about Zen are nonsense. Zen writers do not deny this as several Koans will later indicate. Here we speak, however, mainly about the techniques of Zen such as the sayings which help one achieve Satori, not about Satori itself. Wittgenstein similarly rejects statements which he himself makes, as being higher level philosophical statements. Because he holds that the meaning of a statement is its use in a language-game, he is forced also to maintain that the meaning of his own statements is their use. (Meaning is not for him something separate from or accompanying his statements.) It is notclear, however, why Wittgenstein does not allow the universe of discourse of philosophy to remain as a proper sort of language-game which one can learn like any other. He may say he is not doing philosophy and the Zen Buddhist may say he has no philosophical view, but such assertions seem as self-contradictory as the statement, "I am not now presenting a statement." What Wittgenstein does mean, however, is that his meaning shows itself in his language, but cannot be about itself and furthermore that there is no higher level to appeal to. The only appeal is to everyday or ordinary language. Actual use, then, becomes that about which nothing can be said. It is the given, bed-rock. Perhaps Satori, or the Zen experience, is like that alsoexperience of just what happens, nothing more. But that is just itwhat happens we are not allowed to say. Both philosophies are thought of as having therapeutic effect. Both claim to be philosophies which undo philosophy and so lead us back to the concrete actual real world. The Zen Buddhist takes the supreme mark of the integrated (well) person to be the absence of a mind divided by irresolvable and artificial oppositions, such as that of subject versus object. Wittgenstein says we often go wrong when we are held captive of a wrong sort of picture (1968:115) or concept, for example, that the word "mind" just names a thing or entity. Do not think that "I describe my state of mind" is like "I describe my room." (1968:290) The following statements make Wittgenstein's therapy clear: The results of philosophy are the uncovering of one or another piece of plain nonsense and of bumps that the understanding has got by running its head up against the limits of language. (1968:#119) The exposing and correction of such nonsense serves as therapy. A philosophical problem has the form, I don't know my way about. (1968:123) When philosophers use a word'knowledge,' 'being,' 'object,' 'I,' 'proposition,' 'name'and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language-game which is its original home?What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use. (1968:#116) There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies. (1968:#133) The philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness. (1968:255) A main cause of philosophical diseasea one-sided diet: one nourishes one's thinking with only one kind of example. (1968:#593) This sort of disease is that which Zen also attempts to cure by a release from certain fixed categories. What is your aim in philosophy?to show the fly the way out of the flybottle. (1968:309) In Zen, the therapy is achieved in various ways as will be seen. Suzuki tells us that Zen is practical for psychiatry. One goal of Zen is to save us from going crazy or being crippled. (1956, cf. his Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis.) We are told by Wittgenstein and adherents of Zen not to meddle with the natural flow. If we do, we distort, and so have need for therapy. The therapy sometimes involves, in Zen, one's answering one's own questions, working out one's problem for oneself. A Zen saying is, "If you do not get it from yourself, where will you go for it?" This expression of individuality is seen in the vulgar assertion about Buddha: "When you utter the name of Buddha, wash your mouth out." Zen supposedly has the therapeutic effect of returning one to oneself. It is not yet clear, however, what that is like for the therapy for Zen revolves around the ineffable Satori. But Wittgenstein's therapy of returning to ordinary language, involving as it does the question of what is and what is not ordinary, may involve the ineffable also. This is especially so if we can answer the question only in ordinary language. (The translation of Koans and Haikus and sayings is often free. The translations that appear here are those found in Suzuki and Blyth in the texts mentioned earlier.) Monk: How may I enter the Way? Master: (pointing to a mountain stream) Do you hear the sound of that torrent? There you may enter. This Koan stresses the concrete, the everyday, the immediate, the actual, the natural, the identity of oneself with objects. The breaking down of the distinction between oneself and object is indicated by suggesting that one may enter the Way, by entering the torrent, by becoming the torrent. For the moment, we need not be concerned that Wittgenstein might call this a misuse of grammar. Monk: How may I enter the Way? Master: Do you smell the mountain laurel? Monk: Yes. Master: There, I have held nothing back from you. Here the notion is stressed that the actual is a familiar and everyday sort of thing, perhaps too familiar for we sometimes think that there must be something hidden behind what we see. There is not. Wittgenstein wrote, The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice somethingbecause it is always before one's eyes. (1968:#129) and If I say it is hiddenthen how do I know what I have to look for? I am in a muddle. (1968:#153) Adherents of Zen do say that their sayings point beyond themselves to the transcendent, but they also say that they are themselves only, and should be taken at face value. Relevant to this is the notion of contradiction discussed later. Wittgenstein supports these three main ideas, namely, the support of the concrete and actual, dissolving the distinction between for example, subject and object, and rejection of the ideas that there are hidden and theoretical entities. He stresses the actual and concrete by stressing actual language usage as it was originally learned. We will see, too, that both Zen and Wittgenstein stress the colloquial, that is, actual usage. The way Wittgenstein dissolves the distinction between subject and object is not so easy to see. It involves the fact that Wittgenstein asserts that words do not usually name, but rather have their function in a particular situation. "What d'ya know?" for instance, is not an inquiry into someone's inner state of knowing, but rather functions to entice someone to say something. The error we, supposedly, usually commit is that we think words for inner states usually name or describe entities, states, or inner processes. He thus asserts that words for feelings, emotions, inner functions, inner powers, notions such as "I," "self," "explain," "true," "certain," "identity," "time" do not name things or have fixed definitions. "Will," "memory," "imagination," "wish" "understanding," are not names for inner things or processes. A woman knows of herself, and the very notion of "herself," by means of an intersubjective language learned in a public situation. This undermines the notion of there being an inner, private mental world as opposed to a public world. This attack on privacy and the breaking down of the distinction between subject and object is also where Zen and ordinary-language meet. It may be pointed out, however, that Zen often stresses the inner, private, subjective experience. And Wittgenstein, too, sometimes admits that some inner processes may be taking placeit is just not clear how we can know what they are. Again, we are confronted by the ineffable. So we have to deny the yet uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored medium. And now it looks as if we had denied mental processes. And naturally we don't want to deny them. (1968:#308) In light of the Zen view that language and its categories cannot fully describe, they assert that even the seeing into oneself which they advocate is too binding and is inaccurate. Wittgenstein seems to have us imagine a sort of soulless tribe as a way of getting rid of the picture, the "accompanying" picture, that is, getting rid of the notion of supposedly hidden, private states. The theme runs through the entire Philosophical Investigations. People are thought of as being public, doing, living creatures not possessed of a private special world. An 'inner process'' [if there are any] stands in need of outward criteria. (1968:#580) The distinction of subject and object, like that of private and public, is thus undermined. Kuang cut off his arm to show that he could endure what is necessary in order to learn. At this Bodhi-Dharma said that the doctrine of Buddhism is not to be sought through another. (A statement stressing the subjective and private.) But consider: Kuang: My soul is not yet pacified. Pray, master, pacify it. Bodhi-Dharma: Bring your soul here, and I will have it pacified. Kuang: I have sought it these many years and am still unable to get hold of it. Bodhi-Dharma: There! it is pacified once for all. There is not place to seek the mind; It is like the footprints of the birds in the sky. Monk: What is the Tao [the Way, the Truth]? Master: Your everyday mind. When I am hungry, I eat;when tired. I sleep. Here again is the stress on the ordinary and actual which Wittgenstein calls a "form of life," as well as the rejection of the notion of inner states, such as mind. A Zen saying is, "When we are hungry we eat, when sleepy, we lay downwhere does the infinite or finite [dualism] come in here?" Intellect supposedly murders. Life as it is lived suffices. "When fish are carried home, don't bother eternally with the basket." Act and do without asking why, and so involving ourselves in thinking we are performing a meaningful task when we are notwhen, as Wittgenstein says, The confusions which occupy us arise when language is like an engine idling, not when it is doing work. (1968:#132) We cannot escape from ordinary language nor can we escape from what we see and do. The Zen person says: Q. We have to dress and eat every day, and how can we escape from all that? A. We dress. we eat. Wittgenstein similarly says, What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use. (1968:#116) Just as with ordinary-language games, what Zen is is itself, and nothing more about it can be said. Monk: What is Zen? Master That's it. That is it, and to find out what it is we need only look and see. One cannot guess how a word functions. One has to look at its use and learn from that. (1968:#340) It is what we see around us everydaywhat we ordinarily say. It is as we see it in a Haiku: A stray cat Asleep on the roof In the spring rain. It is the given. Wittgenstein stresses the given in the following: Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it. For it cannot give it any foundation either. It leaves everything as it is. (1968:#124, 226) Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. Since everything lies open to view, there is nothing to explain. (1968:#126) The primitive language-game which children are taught needs no justification; attempts at justification need to be rejected. (1968:200) What has to be accepted, the given, is so one could say'forms of life.' (1968:226) But how is this sentence appliedthat is, in our everyday language? For I got it from there and nowhere else. (1968:#134) When I obey a rule, I do not choose. I obey the rule blindly. (1968:#219) Our mistake is to look for an explanation where we ought to look at what happens as a 'proto-phenomenon' (a given). (1968:#654) The stress on the given is what is indicated in the following Koans: Monk: Please instruct me in Zen. Master: Have you had your breakfast yet or not? Monk: Yes, master, I have. Master: If so, have your dishes washed. (Suzuki 1964:81, 88) It [life] is like a sword that wounds, but cannot wound itself; Like an eye that sees, but cannot see itself. Nothing whatever is hidden; From of old, all is clear as daylight. The blue hills are of themselves blue hills; The white clouds are of themselves white clouds. Monk: What is Zen? Master: Not a word to be predicated. Thus, both philosophies present us with the view that reality or the actual, is a given, and nothing can be said about it. Reason and knowing are not relevant to that given. It just is. For Zen, even to say anything about Zen is to go wrong. Thus, paradox often characterizes the Koan and Zen Haiku. This paradox is not distant from the statement by Heraclitus: The path up and down is one and the same. Mortals are immortals and immortals are mortals, the one living the other's death and dying the other's life. (Shibles 1971b:41-49) Paradox often gives us insight, which the Zen sayings meant to do. Contradiction is often at the heart of these Koans. Whatever is said about anything supposedly implies that the opposite may be said also. That Buddha is one, implies that "he" is many. Here again is another instance of the breaking down of categories. In this case, the category of contradiction is used to indicate the dissolution, "unraveling complications...smoothing out he dust (of discrimination)this is the mysterious leveling." (cf. The philosopher Berkeley said that we first raise the dust and then claim that we cannot see.) When you have a staff, I will give you one. When you have none, I will take it away from you. Consider the following Zen sayings: One who seeks the Dharma [truth] finds it in seeking it in nothing. Only when seeing is no-seeing is there real Zen. The cock announces the dawn in the evening. The sun is bright at midnight. The frog Rises up by the same force with which it jumps in. (A Haiku) From now on my eyes were one with my ears, my ears with my nose, my nose with my mouth. A long thing is the short body of Buddha. A short thing is the short body of Buddha. There is nothing you see that is not a flower; there is nothing you can think of which is not the moon. A mountain is not high, nor is a pillar vertical. Since there is no gate let me tell you how to pass through it. Don't follow sound and chase color. Does the sound come to the side of the ear or the ear to the border of the sound? If one expects to hear the truth with one's ear, it may be difficult to comprehend it. By listening with one's eye, one will for the first time be intimate with it. What is Tao? Ordinary mind is Tao. Should we try to face it? Should one try to face it, one deviates from it. A robber threatensthere is no robber. To be able to trample on the Great Void, the iron crow must sweat. Seeing, they see not; Hearing, they hear not. Where the interplay of "is" and "is not" is fixed, Not even the sages can know. Simply, you must empty "is" of meaning, And not take "is not" as real. It (truth) cannot be attained by mind; It is not to be sought after through mindlessness. It [truth] cannot be created by speech; It cannot be penetrated by silence. What characterizes these sayings is an attack on the principle of contradiction, reason, and traditional categories of discrimination. Religion is often sought by denying reason. But Wittgenstein attacks at least this much. His view is such that nearly everything that is now thought to be named is no longer a thing. It has meaning and function only as part of a learned, and thus given, language-gamethat is, in ordinary language and usage. Memory is no longer a state or process, but becomes a word with a use, and gains its meaning from that use. Thus, "imagination," "understanding," "thought," "mind," no longer stand for internal states. Inner states and processes are categories which, as such, are dissolved. This, if true, gives support to the Zen attack on certain common definitions and distinctions. The Zen conclusion is mystical; Wittgenstein's conclusion is concrete and rational. For Wittgenstein, if meaning is use, then the opposing of concepts and the principle of contradiction also becomes undermined. In their place are put models, paradigm cases, and language-games. There are no absolutes which may be once and for all opposed. Consider: The only correlate in language to an intrinsic necessity is a rule.'(1968:#372) Of the opposition of internal-external, Wittgenstein says, as stated earlier, An 'inner process' stands in need of outward criteria. (1968:#580) What Wittgenstein is saying is that about the internal, none of us knows what to say. If the meaning, for example, of reason and emotion are their uses, then they are not opposed as entities, but only as actual uses. But it is clear that uses can oppose. The same term may be used in many different ways, forms a "family" of uses. It will not do any longer to say that reason, as such, is opposed to emotion as such. They are not entities and they are not single things. Wittgenstein holds that if you do not have a test, do not say, for example, "Either he thinks or he doesn't." Contradiction does not apply here. One may instead say, as the Zen person might, "One thinks and one doesn't think" and that is to say that our distinctions break down. Wittgenstein regarded the emulation of private states and the law of noncontradiction as a picture or model which erroneously holds us captive. He wrote, For one can quite well call the Law of Contradiction false, on the grounds that we very often make good sense by answering a question "Yes and no." (1956:53) Certainly the history of ideas reveals the constantly changing and undermining of ideas and principles previously held to be certain, such as the opposition of subjectobject, beautifulugly, innerouter, spacetime, bodymind, truefalse, perceivingperceived, etc. The Zen person runs the beautiful and ugly together, and appreciates both. It is a form of grotesque or "taboo" humor: The cow comes Moo ! Moo ! Out of the mist. (A Haiku) The young girl Blew her nose In the evening glory. (A Haiku) In showing how Wittgenstein rejects certain definitions and distinctions, we may note that his arguments are often as brief and concise as a Koan. The notion of self-identity is regarded as a useless statement. It is as if in imagination we put a thing into its own shape and saw that it fitted. (1968:#216) Also, to say that two different things are identical is wrong. Roughly speaking, to say of two things that they are identical is nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to say nothing at all. (1933:5.5303 ) "War is war" is not an example of the law of identity either. (1968:221) All those words which supposedly stand for internal states are analyzed so that they no longer stand for such states. It was mentioned that internal processes stand in need of outward criteria. So also, whatever use to which the "mental" can be put, physical things will serve equally well. We speak of inner life with terms used for spatial outer things. Under attack is the notion that there go on in us such processes as knowing, understanding, believing, thinking, remembering, feeling, sensing, intending, meaning, expecting, concentrating, willing, inner or silent speech, hoping, dreaming, judging, and deciding. Wittgenstein gives some insight into these processes by giving us short tests for and comments about them. His statements are very much like Haikus and Koans in being abrupt and challenging. Consider the following sorts of statements he makes. These provide a rich source for humor. Repeating a word again and again shows that in itself, without a use in a situation, it becomes meaningless. Understanding is an arrow. Consult the arrow, the actual use in language not the "inner thought." "I see!," "I understand!" are not descriptions of something internal. Point to two bolts. The pointing seems specific, but how can you define the number two that way rather than just a group? Point to a piece of paper, then its shape, color, and number. How did you do it? How did you "mean" it? How did you "concentrate" on it? Don't speak absolutely about the "simple" parts of a chair. Simple depends on a point of view or context. Don't even look for the essence of a language-game. There is no definite boundary to it. One sentence is not more fundamental than another. If to define is to picture, then what shape is green? I use words correctly which I do not know the meaning of. Augustine: If you ask me (e.g., what time is) I don't know. If you don't ask me, I know. We also play the game of making up rules as we go along. There is no limit to the uses of language. "Chair" is also played in the game of thinking of it as an illusion. "Good" is meaningless until you look and see how you use it. An explanation averts one misunderstanding that would but for it have occurredbut does not avert every misunderstanding. There are other contexts in which to use "explain." Stick to the subjects of everyday thinking, otherwise we feel as if we had to repair a torn spider's web with our fingers. "What is a word really?" is like "What is a piece in chess?" Meaning as a picture does not fit meaning as a use. The picture exists in his imagination? Why not rather a drawing, construction or model in front of him? When do you know a certain thing? Day and night? Always? Is knowing a state, one having duration? When did you stop understanding that word? Causation doesn't underlie, but rather is established by experiments. Not any one feature occurs in all cases of reading. I do not feel the movement of the lever which connects seeing the letters with speaking. Don't think marks make you want to utter certain sounds. Do you feel the influence of being influenced as you read? Perhaps the Will is not a phenomenon. I make a movement with my hand. But what is the guiding character of the movement? A person can look at pointing in reverse, that is, from finger tip to wrist. The whole act isn't in one when one says, "I know how to go on." Is the possibility of movement like a shadow of the movement itself? To know is to act and react, not to give reasons. The balance on which impressions are weighed is not the impression of a balance. What are the criteria for remembering a color right? A memory image cannot be tested for correctness. It is unverifiable that one section of hunans have one sensation of red and another section another. Don't think you read off the rules from the facts. These rules too would need rules. To say "I believe he is in pain" is just making a decision to say this instead of "He is in pain." How do I know that this color is red.?It would be an answer to say: "I have learnt English." We have to deny the yet uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored medium (mental and other "internal "states). To be clear about the word "think," don't watch yourself while you think to observe what the word means. Was what I was just doing thinking; am I not making a mistake? Say: "Yes, this pen is blunt. Oh well, it'll do." First, thinking it; then without thought; then just think the thought without the words. Can you? Do words occur in the order one thinks them? Did I really intend the whole construction of the sentence at its beginning? A machine can't think because it has no place to think. But neither do people. Can you point to imagination? What is the meaning of "this image?" Can you point to one? The same one twice? Do you "possess" thought? The "visual room" seemed like a discovery, but it is just a new way of speaking. "I am..." "I" doesn't name anyone here. (cf. Zen selflessness) What does certainty really amount to?: If I put my hand in the fire I get burned. What does a person think for? What use is it? Does it follow from the sense-impressions which I get that there is a chair over there? How can a proposition follow from sense impressions? Say "It's cold here" and mean "It's warm here." Can you? Is negation a mental activity? Mental is not a presupposition we must make. Does some feature of our memory image tell us the time to which it belongs? I can only see, not hear, red and greenbut sadness I can hear as much as I can see it. Sadness is walking down a long gray tunnel. He senses the truth. With which sense? Above all, don't wonder, "What can be going on in the eyes and brain?" in order to analyze the meaning of a word. Is your thought as long as your sentence? You can calculate in your head? Can you decorate the wall, in your head? Does "He can play chess" name a state? Can you remember what remembering was like last Tuesday? It would not be correct to say, as we did earlier, that Wittgenstein rejects all inner states, or that he is consistent in rejecting them, or that he is consistent in everything he says. He is not, depending upon which way we look at what he wrote. However, establishing consistency is not the task here. We may look at each statement Wittgenstein makes as a separate model or paradigm case. Wittgenstein in his preface to the Investigations says that his remarks are a number of sketches of landscapes made in the course of long and involved journeyings. In any case, the above statements show how Wittgenstein set about to undo a great number of pictures of reality which we are, he thinks, captivated by. It has that in common with Zen. Instead of resting secure with a partial view of, for example, "mental entities," the notion is placed in a total and living context or "form of life." Notions are brought back to the whole context also in Zen. The character and nature of the Koan and Haiku are similar to Wittgenstein's writings also in that contexts and concepts are combined which are not usually associated with one another. This either exposes commonly accepted and literally accepted notions to meaninglessness, or gives us insight into their meaning. A large number of statements we utter are seen to be disguised forms of jokes. Wittgenstein once said that a serious and good philosophical work could be written that would consist entirely of jokes. (Malcolm 1958:29) And he wrote, My aim is: to teach you to pass from a piece of disguised nonsense to something that is patent nonsense. (1968:#464) The humor involved is, as mentioned earlier, a kind of therapy which reveals where we go wrong. The mistakes involve misleading grammatical parallels, category-mistakes of various sorts or, in general, conceptual confusion. Wittgenstein talks of Misunderstandings concerning the use of words, caused among other things, by certain analogies between the forms of expression in different regions of language. (1968:#90) We know that such statements as the following are not correct, but there are other incorrectly used expressions which escape our notice: What is the sum of two plus apples? She sat down grammatically. He has five cents in his pocket grammatically. I rode my bicycle in French. The number seven hurts. I have N friends and N2 + 2N + 2 = 0. The context confusion involves, for instance, talking of inner life in terms used for spatial outer things. But Wittgenstein's insights and humor center around breaking loose from traditional categories by comparing concepts not previously compared. Malcolm related how Wittgenstein, to effectively wash dinner dishes in appreciation of Malcolm's hospitality, thought nothing of sweeping the dishes off to the bathtub to do an effective washing job. We saw some of the ways in which this washing job was done on so-called "inner mental states." Zen does a similar job using a similar method, and arrives at a notion of humans not too different in a waya doctrine of no-mind, and selflessness. Examples of Wittgenstein's humor follow. Most examples are his own. The first ones indicate that statements which seem parallel, are not, but the grammar misleads us into thinking that they are. When we see that they are misleading, we see that they involve a disguised joke. In all these cases, the first sentence or word is not like the second: My mind is made up (is not like:) My bed is made up. Inner speech. Whispering. I mean something. I say something. Where is your mind? Where is your book? Where is your pain? Where is your pen? The present event passes by. A log passes by. A minute passes by. A car passes by. Who made the world? Who made the shoes? Where is your intelligence? Where is your book? Your mind is in your head. Your apples are in your pail. A man is (at all ). A man is there. What are you for? What is your eraser for? Where did the time go? Where did the paper go? He said in his mind "340." He said in Russian "340." Thinking is a process. Digestion is a process. He digests his ideas. He digests food. What's on your mind? What's on the stove? Things are stored in your memory. Things are stored in a warehouse. I saw him in a dream. I saw him in the theater. I consulted my imagination. I consulted a timetable. The following Zen sayings reflect several types of humor, for instance, incongruity, repeating the question, answering what is irrelevant. It might be appropriate on Wittgenstein's view, to take "I don't know," or "Silence, please," as appropriate answers to questions which are meaningless or misleading, such as "Where is your understanding?" Wittgenstein is reported to have actually said such a thing in his lectures on philosophical psychology. (Since a statement such as "My wishes and desires are in my head," is unenlightening, one may as well answer something quite irrelevant, as the Zen person does.) Several typical humorous Zen sayings follow: Monk: What I wish to know is where is Nansen gone after his death? Master: As to that it makes one think. Monk: What I wish to know is where is Nansen gone after his death? Master: When Sekito was still in the order of young novitiates, he saw the sixth patriarch. Monk: What is the fundamental teaching of the Buddha? Master: Is there enough breeze in this fan to keep me cool? Monk: What is Zen? Master: It is cloudy today and I won't answer. Monk: What is Buddhahood? Master: The bottom of a pail is broken through? Monk: What is Zen? Master: Zen. In the garden the camellia is blooming whitely. The sea darkens: Voices of the wild ducks Are faintly white. The two preceding Haikus indicate a breaking out into striking usages which, although they are misuses, may serve as useful models or hypotheses. Why does not a camellia bloom whitely? Is blue a noun by nature? In some languages we say, "It blues." Are we misled by grammar, into thinking that blue is substantive rather than a process or action? There is, of course, some humor in the Zen statements quoted earlier which serves to undermine distinctions and oppositions. For example: A long thing is the long body of Buddha. A short thing is the short body of Buddha. The quotation of both philosophies have a number of different meanings and uses not all of which can be explored here. Both philosophies stress giving free play to the creative impulses. Wittgenstein's models or paradigm cases and examples of misleading parallels are revealing as are statements of a Koan and Haiku. One sort of notion both philosophies give insight into is that of "explanation," or "cause." A Zen analysis runs: 1. The pennant is inanimate and it is the wind that makes it flap. 2. Both wind and pennant are inanimate and flapping is an impossibility. 3. The flapping is due to a certain combination of cause and condition. 4. After all, there is no flapping pennant, but it is the wind that is moving by itself. 5. It is neither wind nor pennant, but your mind that flaps. Because the stress is on actual speech and action, "cause" and "explanation" are more part of such actions than simple reports of it. Wittgenstein attacks internal states as causes of behavior, as well as the notion of cause as divorced from our ordinary use of the word. The case is the same with the meaning of words like "explain." To say X causes Y is not necessarily to give a report or make a claim about the existence of causality. It is rather to know when to use the word "cause." One view Wittgenstein has is, then, that there is no real cause, explanation, or influence. There is no explanation for explanation. We cannot explain the meanings of words. We can merely use them. Another way to say this is that the "cause" shows itself by its use, but it has no essential definition. This is in line with the view held by both philosophies that it is showing (doing), not telling (explaining) which is important. Such words as "cause" and "explain," like "language" and "experience," are often thought of as being of a higher level than words such as "book" and "chair." Wittgenstein, however, says, If the words 'language,' 'experience,' 'world,' have a use, it must be as humble a one as that of the words 'table,' 'lamp, 'door.' (1968:#97) We are reminded again of the statements: Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it. For it cannot give it any foundation either. It leaves everything as it is. (1968:124) 'Have I reasons?' The answer is: my reasons will soon give out. And then I shall act, without reasons. (1968:#211) It is not the case that causality has one meaning (use), but rather that there are as many meanings as usesas many models of cause as we wish to find. The Zen approach is similar in its stress on the many aspects of each thing we consider. In neither philosophy are we allowed to be held captive by a single picture, or distinction. It is, as we mentioned, a philosophic disease to be able to see only one kind of model. The model Wittgenstein thought us most mistakenly addicted to is that of namingthat words supposedly name entities. In Zen, naming is opposed also, because it leads to dualism. For both philosophies there is not just one way or aspect. (cf. 1968:#91) There is no final way, no final demonstration. The method of insight through humor brings this out.  From Shibles, Warren. Wittgenstein, Language and Philosophy. Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall-Hunt, 1974a. (Also in German by Bouvier, Bonn 1973 and in Portuguese by Editora Cultrix, Brazil, 1974. "Wittgenstein y el budismo Zen." Pensamiento (Madrid) 49, 194 (1993) 317-352) "Wittgenstein and Zen." Anthologized in Self, Society, and the Search for Transcendence W. Bruening, Palo Alto, CA: National Press Books 1974.  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METHODS USED IN ORDINARY-LANGUAGE PHILOSOPHY: WITTGENSTEIN, ZEN, AND HUMOR. The account of time in Alice given earlier illustrates ordinary-language (as well as other) techniques of clarifying concepts. There is stress on metaphorical insight, category or context-mistakes, juxtapositions, substitution and the use of humor to gain knowledge. The following is an account of, and the techniques used in, the ordinary-language philosophy of Wittgenstein. (cf. Shibles 1974a, 1993b) A comparison will be made here between some of the major tenets of Zen Buddhism and the ordinary-language philosophy of Wittgenstein. The attempt will not establish that they are identical, that if we look closely, we will see how nicely a certain form fits itself. What will be seen is that there are significant similarities to be found, that a knowledge of these contributes to our understanding of each philosophy and that humor plays a significant part of the analysis. In order to ensure concreteness and accuracy, the comparison will be based on statements only from Wittgenstein, some Zen sayings, Koans, and Haikus. The Koan is a theme, statement or question given the Zen pupil for solution and understanding. It will hopefully lead the beginner to Satori or enlightenment. It is not assumed here that all sects of Zen stress Satori, nor that there is one single view which is true of all adherents of Zen. The Rinzai sect of Zen Buddhism places great stress on the Koan as a way to enlightenment. Rinzai monks are given books of these to read and examine. (Mumonkwan and Hekigan-roku are two important collections.) To this extent, language does play a part in some quarters of Zen. No attempt is made to compare ordinary-language philosophy with adherents of Zen who say nothing, but sit for years in silence facing a wall. The Haiku is a very short poem which, in the case of these cited, is an expression of the Zen attitude. The Koan examples are taken from the writings of Suzuki on Zen Buddhism, and the Haiku examples are mainly from Blyth, Haiku (1965). To begin, we see that both Wittgenstein and Zen reject philosophy. Wittgenstein writes, Most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical. (1933:4.003) For philosophical problems arise when language goes on a holiday. (1968:38) Let us ask ourselves: why do we feel a grammatical joke to be deep? (And that is what the depth of philosophy is.) (1968:111) When we do philosophy, we should like to hypostatize feelings where there are none. (1968:598) When we do philosophy we are like savages, primitive people, who hear the expressions of civilized men, put a false interpretation of them, and then draw the queerest conclusions from it. (1968:194) Master Tokusan burns his books and says, "All our understanding of the abstractions of philosophy is like a single hair in the vastness of space." 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(1933:5.5303)1 D15  Where does our investigation get its importance from, since it seems only to destroy everything interesting, that is, all that is great and important? (As it were all the buildings, leaving behind only bits of stone and rubble.) What we are destroying is nothing but houses of cards and we are clearing up the ground of language on which they stand. 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